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Central bank instruments to deal with the effects of  
the crisis on emerging market economies 
Ramon Moreno
1 
The bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers on 15 September 2008 was accompanied by disruptions 
in financing to emerging market economies (EMEs), as reflected in the sharp declines in 
cross-border financing, the increases in sovereign spreads and the pressures in the foreign 
exchange and domestic financial markets.
2 Policymakers in EMEs responded to these 
developments by increasing foreign and domestic currency financing or liquidity.
3 They used 
a variety of tools, including central bank operations in the foreign exchange and domestic 
money markets, the establishment of financing facilities, guarantees, and changes in 
regulations, reserve requirements and policy rates. This paper discusses some of these 
tools, as well as their characteristics and effectiveness. It concludes by briefly reviewing what 
central banks have learned about the instruments at their disposal in dealing with a crisis. 
I.  Foreign currency financing 
In response to the crisis, central banks sought to provide foreign currency financing or 
liquidity to the private sector in order to: ensure the continued operation of foreign exchange 
(FX) markets (eg by lowering the cost of foreign currency financing as reflected in the 
increases in FX swap-implied foreign currency rates); compensate for interruptions in the 
availability of external private financing (eg by compensating for the withdrawal of foreign 
loans and supporting FX liquidity management by domestic institutions, or by facilitating the 
rollover of external debt through guarantees or regulatory changes); and prevent disorderly 
exchange rate movements, particularly a downward spiral in the exchange rate.  
EME central banks supplied foreign currency financing through intervention or operations in 
FX markets, as described below. These operations were scaled back in 2009 as FX markets 
stabilised. At least two aspects can be highlighted: (i) the specific measures used to improve 
foreign currency financing and the issues they raised; and (ii) whether the crisis altered the 
views of central banks on the role of FX reserves and exchange market intervention. 
A.  Measures to improve foreign currency financing 
Some of the more important measures to improve foreign currency financing during the peak 
periods of turbulence may be summarised as follows.  
                                                  
1   BIS. Research assistance from Pablo Garcia-Luna, Agne Subelyte and Elias Hafner is acknowledged. The 
discussion in this paper draws heavily on central bank questionnaire responses. I also thank Andre Minella for 
specific comments on Brazil. The discussion in this paper generally covers the period up to end 2009. 
2   See Moreno and Villar (2010). 
3   In this paper, “financing” will refer to operations by the central bank to supply foreign or domestic currency to 
markets (eg via FX market intervention or open market operations) as well as special lending facilities. An 
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  Spot market transactions. A number of central banks (eg in Chile, Colombia, Peru 
and Turkey) discontinued foreign reserve accumulation programmes and some sold 
foreign currency in the spot market (eg in Brazil, India and Mexico).
4 Data on spot 
FX market operations or intervention in some countries, notably in Asia, are not 
available. However, indirect data from forward positions suggest that, in some 
Southeast Asian countries, spot market purchases of foreign currency declined with 
reduced capital inflows.  
  Swap markets. Swap market auctions were widely used to provide financing or 
liquidity in FX markets (eg in Brazil, Chile, Hungary, India, Korea and Poland). For 
example, in the case of Brazil, the central bank had accumulated a large long 
forward position in foreign currency and unwound it by selling traditional swaps 
(where the central bank commits to sell dollars in the future), making up to 
US$ 50 billion available, although a much smaller amount was used.  
  Foreign currency repo facilities. Some central banks (eg in Argentina, Brazil and the 
Philippines) set up foreign currency repo facilities to provide trade finance and to 
help companies roll over their foreign debt. In contrast to swap transactions, which 
provided foreign currency in exchange for domestic assets in the short term, central 
banks provided foreign currency in exchange for foreign currency receivables or 
(eligible) foreign currency securities. However, the use of such facilities varied 
across countries.  
  Loan facilities. Some central banks established dollar loan facilities. For example, 
the Central Bank of Brazil drew on its foreign reserves to auction collateralised loans 
to FX dealers. The Bank of Korea set up a facility to extend foreign currency loans 
secured by export bills, while the Bank of Mexico lent dollars to commercial and 
development banks, drawing on a foreign currency swap line with the US Federal 
Reserve.  
  Implicit or explicit guarantees on external borrowing or bank deposits. A number of 
countries offered guarantees on foreign currency (and also domestic currency) 
deposits, including Hong Kong SAR, Malaysia and Singapore. In Korea, the 
authorities announced a guarantee of up to US$ 100 billion for external debts. In 
some cases, commitments were broader: for example, immediately after the 
collapse of Lehman Brothers, the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) committed to meet 
any demand–supply FX gaps in the domestic FX market. In other cases, the central 
bank stepped in directly as a counterparty: for example, the Central Bank of the 
Republic of Turkey (CBRT) resumed its intermediation role in its FX deposit market 
to ensure the continued operation of that market.  
  Changes in regulations to facilitate foreign borrowing. Examples include: (i) the RBI 
eased restrictions on foreign currency borrowing and raised the ceiling on the 
interest rates that could be paid; and (ii) the Bank of Korea allowed domestic export 
firms to take out foreign currency loans for the settlement of currency option 
(including knock-in/knock-out (KIKO) derivatives) transactions and later abolished 
the restriction on the rollover of foreign currency loans for use as working capital. In 
some cases (eg Colombia and Peru), reserve requirements on foreign currency 
denominated deposits were lowered. In Chile, the central bank also authorised 
some financial institutions to meet their reserve requirements in different 
international reserve currencies (eg the euro and the yen) and not just in US dollars. 
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Three issues pertaining to these foreign currency financing measures may be highlighted: (i) 
choice of instruments; (ii) alternative uses of FX swaps; and (iii) discretionary versus non-
discretionary intervention.
5 
Choice of instruments. The choice of instruments or measures adopted would depend in part 
on the goals and perceived constraints faced by the authorities. For example, a central bank 
seeking to limit exposure to the private sector or counterparty risk might avoid providing 
guarantees and limit the overall value of its transactions in the FX market. The central bank 
might also limit the size of transactions if it wants to show that it does not intend to target the 
exchange rate or otherwise influence perceptions of future monetary policy in a way that 
might be inconsistent with the existing monetary framework. This may be particularly 
important in monetary regimes with highly developed procedures for communicating with the 
public, such as inflation targeting regimes. A central bank wishing to economise on the use of 
foreign reserves might prefer alternatives to drawing on them, such as serving as an 
intermediary between financial institutions (eg as was done by the CBRT) or liberalising 
access to external financing (eg as in India and Korea). As for FX market intervention, 
outright spot sales of foreign reserves would deplete foreign reserves more than alternative 
transactions, which can be a concern if the duration of the turmoil is very uncertain. In 
contrast, collateralised foreign currency lending, foreign currency repos and sales of foreign 
currency via FX swaps imply future repayment or reversal of the transaction, so that any 
depletion in foreign reserves would be temporary. The collateral in such transactions (in the 
case of the swap, the collateral would be in domestic currency), would also limit central bank 
exposure. In practice, the choice would also depend on the perceived scope for replenishing 
reserves from other sources, such as export revenues or capital inflows. 
Uses of FX swaps. A complication in interpreting FX market intervention is that central bank 
FX swap transactions are not always intended to simply increase or decrease the supply of 
foreign currency in the spot market in a way that is reversed at some future date. For 
example, during the crisis, the Central Bank of Brazil sold FX swaps that delivered US dollars 
in the future in order to provide hedges to firms that needed to unwind dollar short derivatives 
positions. The swap transactions also had the effect of unwinding the Central Bank of Brazil’s 
long foreign currency position.
6 Another example is that some central banks in Asia that buy 
foreign currency in the spot market sterilise via an offsetting swap transaction in which they 
sell foreign currency spot and buy it forward. In particular, the evolution of official net 
(positive) foreign currency positions in a number of EMEs during the period of exchange rate 
appreciation from around 2005 to 2008 was consistent with increased spot purchases of 
foreign currency that were sterilised via FX swaps. A subsequent decline in net forward 
positions during the most recent period of exchange rate depreciation suggests that central 
banks reduced their foreign currency purchases as foreign currency inflows fell. In those 
cases where net forward positions turned negative, the central bank may have sold foreign 
currency in the spot market, at least partly sterilising via swap transactions. However, in 
some countries, the connection between forward positions and the exchange rate is much 
looser; this could be because the sterilisation is incomplete, other sterilisation instruments 
are available or because there is little connection between operations in the FX market and 
the exchange rate. A question of interest is what determines how swaps are used in the FX 
market (eg to provide foreign currency in the spot market, to sterilise, to provide hedges for 
the private sector, etc). For example, one might expect that swaps would be used to sterilise 
spot transactions if alternative sterilisation instruments were unavailable or particularly costly 
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(eg when the supply of government securities is limited or domestic interest rates are much 
higher than FX rates so the carry cost of foreign reserve holdings is higher). 
Discretionary versus non-discretionary intervention. In some countries, FX market 
intervention was non-discretionary. This was to underscore that central banks were not 
targeting an exchange rate level, which, as past experience has shown, can trigger 
speculative attacks. For this reason, auctions were widely used. For example, Colombia 
followed a rule whereby large exchange rate movements triggered auctions of so-called 
volatility “call” options (giving market participants the option to buy foreign currency from the 
central bank). This mechanism was triggered in October 2008 and in the first two months of 
2009. Mexico adopted a rule to set the daily amount to be auctioned (initially US$ 400 
million, lowered to US$ 250 million by May 2009) with a minimum price floor. However, non-
discretionary intervention posed some difficulties. Some commentary suggests that in 
Mexico, the floor set a basis for speculation. Also, the amounts of foreign currency supplied 
by the rules could sometimes fall short of demand. The central bank introduced two 
measures with different features: (i) daily auctions with no price floor; and (ii) direct sales in 
FX market operations.
7 
B.  Role of foreign reserves  
A key issue in central bank operations in the FX markets was the availability of foreign 
currency. Most central banks drew on their foreign reserve holdings, which in some cases fell 
significantly compared to mid-2008 levels before recovering – in Asia by as much as 15–30%, 
in Latin America by 7–15% and in other EMEs by as much as 25–35%. Central banks 
replenished their reserves as soon as the opportunity arose, particularly as capital flows 
recovered sometime after March 2009 (Graph 1). In some cases, current account surpluses 
have supported recent foreign reserve accumulation. The crisis brought two issues into sharp 
relief: (i) foreign reserve adequacy; and (ii) alternatives to foreign reserve accumulation.  
1.  Foreign reserve adequacy 
Some conventional indicators suggest that reserve holdings have remained ample (Table 1).
 
For example, foreign reserve cover of short-term external debt, an approximate indicator of 
the ability to meet financing requirements should external funding be interrupted, was 
generally well in excess of the Guidotti-Greenspan threshold of 100%, even in countries 
where foreign reserves fell significantly.
8 In some countries where the decline in foreign 
reserves has persisted, the foreign reserve to short-term external debt ratio has not fallen (in 
the case of Malaysia, for example, it has risen sharply), suggesting that the declines in 
foreign reserves were associated with declines in short-term external debt. An interesting 
question is: under what conditions should foreign reserves be used to retire short-term 
external debt as opposed to encouraging rollovers of such debt?  
 
                                                  
7   For further discussion of foreign exchange market intervention in Latin America in response to the crisis see 
Jara, Moreno and Tovar (2010). 
8    In Malaysia, the ratio did not fall, suggesting that the declines in foreign reserves were associated with 





















































































Sources: IMF, national data. 
 
Reserve adequacy concerns nevertheless appear to have arisen. Some have argued that, 
rather than focusing on the ratio of foreign reserves to short-term external debt, policymakers 
should seek to ensure that foreign reserves are high enough to prevent simultaneous runs on 
a country’s banking system and its currency. This would suggest tracking an indicator like 
foreign reserves to M2. Some recent research suggests that, according to this criterion, 
foreign reserve holdings were not that excessive, and that countries with higher foreign 
reserves to M2 experienced less depreciation pressure.
9 
Even foreign reserves to M2 may not provide a complete picture. First, markets appear to 
care not only about the level of foreign reserves, but their rapid or persistent depletion. 
Second, foreign reserve levels that exceed conventional rules of thumb may still be seen as 
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insufficient if they are low compared to a country’s peers. Third, in some countries, the 
government (via sovereign wealth funds) or the private sector (eg pension funds) holds large 
amounts of foreign assets. The repatriation of some of these assets appears to have helped 
stabilise external financing conditions during periods of financial stress. In those cases, 





  Outstanding year-end position  As a percentage of 




  96 07 08 09 09 96 07 08 09 96 07 08 09 
Asia
3  477 2,907 3,318 4,028 55 170 449 586 545 22 35  35  35
China  105 1,528 1,946 2,399 49 376 1,249 1,868 1,597 11 28 28 27
Hong Kong SAR  63 147 178 245 116 36 144 189 252 19 19  22  29
India  20 267 247 259 21 260 340 338 302 11 28  27  23
Indonesia  18 55 49 60 11 51 185 174 198 15 31 30 27
Korea  33 262 200 265 32 45 176 172 175 6 19  19  20
Malaysia  26 101 91 93 49 226 447 402 544 20 40  35  31
Philippines  10 30 33 37 23 121 225 406 305 26 39 43 43
Singapore  77 163 174 188 106 44 127 150 164 73 77  75  69
Thailand  37 85 108 134 51 80 866 997 1,048 18 31 38 42
Latin America
  142 397 440 466 13 145 238 362 305 71 47  49  37
Argentina  18 44 44 43 14 60 200 279 350 27 51 49 46
Brazil  58 179 193 232 15 111 292 364 300 21 20  24  18
Chile  16 17 23 25 16 201 86 113 130 54 18 28 25
Colombia  9 20 23 23 10 142 201 390 374 23 26 28 24
Mexico  19 86 94 94 11 60 256 240 277 13 15 18 16
Peru  11 27 30 31 24 166 284 248 309 266 165  157  132
Venezuela  11 24 33 18 5 273 347 901 398 91 33 36  0
CEE
4,5  78 753 703 724 20 452 153 144 167 ... 38  40  37
Czech Republic  12 35 37 42 21 262 200 236 311 32 25 27 27
Hungary  10 24 34 42 33 169 88 99 126 49 29 43 50
Poland  18 66 62 80 19 718 245 178 236 37 29 28 31
Russia  11 467 413 417 34 42 493 490 618 22 86  86  80
Turkey  16 73 70 69 11 125 124 119 132 35 23 24 20
Other  25 359 510 488 50 263 605 993 695 ... 72  89  80
Israel  11 28 42 59 30 565 587 556 590 38 34 44 53
Saudi Arabia
6  13 301 438 397 107 217 1,058 2,215 1,254 ... 169 207 176
South Africa  1 29 30 32 11 8 170 207 240 1 12 16 12
1  Regional aggregates for the outstanding year-end position of FX reserves are the sum of the economies listed, simple 
averages  otherwise.    
2    Short-term external debt defined as short-term liabilities to BIS reporting banks: consolidated 
cross-border claims to all BIS reporting banks in countries outside the reporting area with a maturity of up to and including 
one year plus international debt securities outstanding with a maturity of up to one year.    
3  Countries shown plus Chinese 
Taipei.    
4    Central and eastern Europe: Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia and Turkey.    
5  M2 for Croatia unavailable.    
6  For Saudi Arabia, excluding 
investment in foreign securities. 
Sources: IMF; Thompson Reuters; national data.   
 
2.  Alternatives to foreign reserve accumulation 
A number of EMEs have obtained access to foreign currency financing to deal with the crisis. 
An important development following the Lehman Brothers collapse was the significant 
expansion in central bank swap arrangements. In an effort to supply US dollar financing (or 
liquidity) to the global markets, the Federal Reserve implemented a number of swap 
agreements with central banks from advanced market economies (eventually, the size of 
these swap lines was unlimited). The central banks of Brazil, Mexico, Korea and Singapore BIS Papers No 54  79
 
 
also established swap lines with the Federal Reserve (for US$ 30 billion each).
10 In Europe, 
the European Central Bank implemented cooperation agreements with the Central Bank of 
Hungary and the National Bank of Poland. In Asia, in the course of the 2000s, central banks 
concluded a number of bilateral foreign currency swap arrangements, many under the 
so-called Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI). This has been further enhanced by recent initiatives to 
create a US$ 120 billion regional swap facility drawing on foreign reserves of participating 
East Asian central banks (CMI Multilateralisation). Apart from these central bank facilities, 
Colombia, Mexico and Poland gained access to the newly created IMF Flexible Credit Line 
(FCL) aimed at countries with sound fundamentals.  
An ongoing issue is whether central bank swap lines or new IMF facilities can provide 
effective alternatives to foreign reserve accumulation. On the one hand, there is evidence to 
suggest that Federal Reserve swap lines played an important role in restoring stability in 
global FX markets and also in Brazil and Korea.
11 Furthermore, central banks believe that 
foreign reserve holdings and access to central bank swap facilities or to the IMF Flexible 
Credit Line have contributed to improved market confidence.
12 Indeed, some believe that 
even very large foreign reserves might be insufficient to preserve stability if the shock is 
sufficiently large (as was the case in the current crisis). On the other hand, there is more 
certainty and discretion associated with the use of foreign reserves. Some of these 
alternative facilities are of limited duration and future access is uncertain. There may also be 
stigma associated with the use of some of these facilities.
13   
On balance, the crisis appears to have reinforced the perception among EME authorities that 
it is important to maintain sufficiently large foreign reserves. As noted above, many 
authorities resumed foreign reserve accumulation as soon as was feasible. However, reserve 
accumulation is costly and the crisis has also renewed the question of what the appropriate 
indicators of foreign reserve adequacy are, and whether viable alternatives to foreign 
reserves are available. 
II.  Domestic currency financing and monetary policy 
As described in contributions by central banks to this volume and by Moreno and Villar 
(2010),
14 the crisis led to disruptions in some domestic financial markets. For example, the 
prevalence of uncollateralised overnight lending in some markets, as well as heightened 
perceptions of counterparty risk, led to declines in interbank transactions in some countries. 
Reversals of capital inflows in EMEs were sometimes associated with efforts to liquidate 
domestic assets, draining domestic liquidity. In some markets, domestic bond yields picked 
up sharply, and investor demand switched to shorter maturity assets. The liquidity squeeze 
was in some cases accentuated by increased equity market volatility, which increased 
margin requirements. Central bank sales of foreign currency could also add to the liquidity 
drain. In some cases, domestic residents cut off from external financing switched to domestic 
markets for financing or increased their utilisation of domestic liquidity.
 There was also a flight 
                                                  
10   Among the EMEs listed, these facilities have been used by Korea and Mexico. 
11   For example, see Baba and Packer (2009), Stone et al (2009) and Baba and Shim (2010). 
12  For related discussions see, for example, the contributions to this volume by Sidaoui, Cuadra and Ramos 
Francia (2010) on Mexico by Yorukoglu and Atasoy (2010) on Turkey and by Ong (2010).  
13   For further discussion, see Moreno (forthcoming). 
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to quality in some countries as domestic residents moved their funds to larger or more stable 
financial institutions, especially state-owned institutions.  
Policy responses to developments in domestic financial markets may be classified as 
(i)  central bank measures to supply or support domestic currency financing; and 
(ii) adjustments to monetary policy.  
A.   Central bank measures to supply or support domestic currency financing
15 
1.  Central bank operations 
Measures were implemented so as to offset shortfalls in domestic liquidity (if any) and to 
dampen volatility in short-term interest rates. A number of central banks stepped up the scale 
of their open market operations. For example, in August 2008, the Czech National Bank 
(CNB), which traditionally entered the domestic interbank market to drain liquidity, introduced 
extraordinary liquidity-providing repo operations with two-week and three-month maturities. 
While these operations were mostly used at the end of 2008 and the beginning of 2009, they 
were to remain available until the end of 2010.  
The range of assets accepted as collateral in open market operations and their maturity was 
also expanded. For example, a number of central banks (eg in Argentina and the Czech 
Republic) allowed the use of government bonds or guaranteed loans as eligible collateral in 
repo transactions with the central bank. In Korea, the range of collateral was expanded to 
include bank debentures and certain government agency bonds (previously only treasury 
bonds, government-guaranteed bonds and monetary stabilisation bonds were eligible). In 
Chile, bank term deposits were accepted as collateral in central bank repo transactions and 
the central bank extended the overnight liquidity facility for banks to 180-day tenors. Some 
central banks also expanded the range of eligible counterparties for central bank open 
market operations, reducing the focus on banks. For example, the Bank of Korea added 
12 securities companies as eligible counterparties for repo operations to the original list of 
19 banks and two securities companies.  
Some central banks have also used FX swaps to provide domestic currency liquidity. For 
example, the CNB has offered CZK/EUR currency swaps to commercial banks in order to 
provide CZK liquidity to foreign bank branches. (However, this instrument has been 
infrequently used.)  
Central banks also strengthened discount window lending or created special financing 
facilities. In Brazil, the central bank was authorised to use the discount window to buy loan 
portfolios of (small) banks via repo agreements. In India, a special refinance facility allowed 
scheduled commercial banks to borrow up to 1% of their net demand and time liabilities 
(NDTLs) up to a maximum period of 90 days; this facility was offered between October 2008 
and October 2009. In Mexico, the central bank established a new facility allowing banks to 
access liquidity using a broader range of eligible assets than in the existing operating facility 
and at a lower cost.  
It may be noted that in some cases (eg Colombia, Malaysia, South Africa and Thailand) 
domestic currency financing in money markets was unaffected and the central bank did not 
need to resort to special or unconventional measures. 
Policy responses sometimes implied coordination with the Treasury or other state agencies. 
For instance, in Mexico, the government bond markets were disrupted by foreign investors, 
who closed their positions, particularly those at longer maturities. In order to restore the 
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normal functioning of the bond markets, the Mexican Treasury sought to accommodate the 
shift in demand away from long-term bonds to short-term bonds by reducing long-term bond 
issuance during the fourth quarter of 2008 (both for fixed-rate and inflation-indexed 
instruments) and increasing the issuance of short-term instruments.
 16 In parallel, the central 
bank started auctioning interest rate swaps to ease the pressures in credit institutions’ 
balance sheets and, more generally, credit conditions across the economy. As another 
example, the Bank of Korea participated in the creation of funds to recapitalise banks and 
purchase non-performing loans (NPLs).  
Some actions by the authorities in a number of EMEs also had important implications for the 
operation of the financial sector. These include guarantees for debt issuance to improve 
funding conditions in the commercial paper market or to facilitate the rollover of short-term 
domestic debt (eg Mexico), or credit guarantees. In some cases, financing via state-owned 
financial institutions appeared to provide an alternative to the direct provision of financing by 
the central bank.  
2.  Reduced domestic currency reserve requirements  
Many central banks that either maintained high average reserve requirements or had raised 
them prior to the failure of Lehman Brothers were able to reduce them countercyclically in 
response to the crisis. These included China, India and Malaysia in Asia, and Brazil, 
Colombia and Peru in Latin America (Graph 2). Colombia and Peru also used marginal 
reserve requirements, which fell sharply.  
As is well known, domestic bank reserve requirements have traditionally been used as a 
monetary policy tool in countries with less developed financial markets. Central banks lacking 
government securities for open market operations still use reserve requirements to sterilise 
the impact of FX market intervention. However, the crisis highlighted the role of reserve 
requirements in supplying liquidity during periods of financial turmoil. For example, in Brazil, 
reserve requirements were used with a great deal of flexibility. Reduced reserve 
requirements released an estimated R$ 116 billion, or 4% of GDP (2009 prices).
17 An 
innovation was the use of rebates in reserve requirements to encourage purchases of bank 
assets and foreign currency (as a way of offsetting the contractionary impact on the liquidity 
of US dollar sales by the central bank). Specifically, deductions of reserve requirements on 
deposits from leasing companies and on time deposits were allowed if they were used to buy 
assets from other banks subject to certain restrictions, or to buy US dollars.
18 An interesting 
feature of the use of reserve requirements to encourage asset purchases is that they are an 
alternative to the central bank expanding its own balance sheet to undertake asset 
purchases.
19 
                                                  
16  See Sidaoui, Cuadra and Ramos-Francias (2010). In Chile, the issuance of one- and two-year central bank 
bonds was reduced. 
17   The bulk of the released funds referred to drawdowns of the so-called “additional requirements” (that had been 
introduced in the 2002 crisis) (R$ 42 billion), and of the requirements on time deposits (R$ 62 billion). 
18   See details in Mesquita and Toros (2010). The various adjustments to reserve requirements thus include not 
only lower nominal ratios but also changes in other related variables (eg an increase during the crisis in the 
amounts that can be deducted from time deposits from R$300 million to R$2 billion and from additional 
requirements from R$100 million to R$1 billion.) These effects are taken into account in the “effective reserve 
requirements” shown in Graph 2. I thank Jose Antonio Marciano and Rodrigo Collares Arantes of the Central 
Bank of Brazil for making the data available and for providing guidance on interpretation.  
19   Reserve requirements can also play a role as a supplementary tool to interest rate policy. See the 
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1  For major banks.    
2  Repo rate prior to October 2006.    
3 For commercial banks. 
The vertical line marks the date of the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy on 15 September, 2008. 
Sources: Bloomberg; CEIC; Central Bank of Brazil; Central Bank of Peru; national data. 
B.  Adjustments to monetary policy  
The spread of the crisis to EMEs after the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008 
created a dilemma for some EME monetary authorities. On the one hand, credit spreads on 
virtually all financial assets widened as market liquidity dropped sharply. Emerging market 
assets were strongly affected by this, and most EME currencies fell sharply. This shock to 
confidence, and recent high inflation, tended to argue against cutting policy interest rates. 
Second, there was a sharp contraction in global output and a steep and rapid reduction in 
policy rates in the advanced market economies; government bond yields in major markets 
also dropped sharply. The slowdown in growth and widening interest rate differentials in 
favour of EMEs suggested that EMEs had the incentive and leeway to cut interest rates.  
In practice, the timing of the cuts in policy rates varied across countries, reflecting the fact 
that inflation fell more rapidly in some regions, notably in Asia, but remained high in others, 
for example in Latin America (where inflation had exceeded inflation targets for much of 
2008) or in Indonesia and Russia. In terms of the dilemma cited above, policymakers in 
countries still experiencing high inflation at the time of the failure of Lehman Brothers 
apparently assigned greater weight to the risk that easing could increase inflation 
expectations and further unsettle financial markets, thus accentuating depreciation 
pressures, than to the need to offset tighter financing conditions and support economic 
activity. These countries did not lower rates until after the peak period of market turbulence 
had passed and the inflation pressures had declined with the global economic downturn and BIS Papers No 54  83
 
 
lower commodity prices (around December 2008 or January 2009, or even later; see Table 2 
and Graph 2). As noted earlier, the authorities instead relied on alternative tools to support 
the financial sector and economic activity, starting around September or October 2008. The 
cycle of easing, which started earlier in Asia, also generally appears to have ended earlier, 
during the first half of 2009. In contrast, easing continued until late 2009 in a number of Latin 
American economies as well as in other EMEs. However, rates were subsequently raised in 
a number of EMEs. 
 
Table 2 
Changes in monetary policy or short-term interest rates
1 
  Inflation  Monetary policy rates 
Last change





















Emerging Asia              
China  1.2 0.6    5.31  –0.27  22 Dec 08  –2.16  0.00 
Hong Kong SAR  2.0 0.5  …  0.03  –0.02 …  –1.54  –0.17 
India  5.7 7.3  …  4.75  –0.25  21 Apr 09  –2.50  –1.75 
Indonesia  11.1 2.8  4.5±1  6.50  –0.25  5 Aug 09  0.25  –2.75 
Korea  4.1 2.8  3.0±0.5  2.00  –0.50  12 Feb 09  –2.25  –1.00 
Malaysia  4.4 –0.1  …  2.00 –0.50  24 Feb 09  –0.25  –1.25 
Philippines  8.0 4.4  3.5±1  5.00  –0.25  9 Jul 09  –0.50  –1.50 
Singapore  4.3 –0.2  …  0.19  0.06 …  –0.25  –0.06 
Thailand  0.4  3.5  0.5 – 3.0  1.25  –0.25  8 Apr 09  –1.00  –1.50 
Latin America              
Argentina  7.2 7.7  …  9.50  –0.25  21 Oct 09  1.75  –1.50 
Brazil  5.9 4.3  4.5±2  8.75  –0.50  22 Jul 09  0.75  –5.00 
Chile  7.1 –1.4  3±1  0.50 –0.25  9 Jul 09  0.50  –7.75 
Colombia  7.7  2.0  4.5 – 5.5  3.50  –0.50  23 Nov 09  –0.50  –6.00 
Mexico  6.5 3.6  3±1  4.50  –0.25  17 Jul 09  0.00  –3.75 
Peru  6.7 0.2  2±1  1.25  –0.75  6 Aug 09  0.50  –5.25 
Other emerging 
markets 
            
Czech Republic  3.6 1.0  2.0±1  1.00  –0.25  16 Dec 09  –1.25  –1.25 
Hungary  3.5 5.3  3.0  6.25  –0.25  21 Dec 09  1.50  –3.75 
Israel  3.8  3.8  1.0 – 3.0  1.25  0.25  28 Dec 09  –1.75  –1.25 
Poland  3.4 3.7  2.5±1  3.50  –0.25  24 Jun 09  –1.00  –1.50 
Russia  13.3 8.8  …  8.75  –0.25  28 Dec 09  2.00  –4.25 
Saudi Arabia  9.0 4.0  …  2.00  –0.50 Jan  09  –3.00  –0.50 
South Africa  9.0  5.8  3.0 – 6.0  7.00  –0.50  13 Aug 09  –0.50  –4.50 
Turkey  10.1 6.5  7.5  6.50  –0.25  19 Nov 09  –1.75  –8.50 
Memo:              
Euro area  1.6 0.9  Below, 
but close 
to, 2 
1.00 –0.25  7  May  09  –1.75  –1.50 
Japan  0.4 –1.9  …  0.30 –0.20  19 Dec 08  –0.45  0.00 
United States  0.1 2.7  …  0.13  –0.88  16 Dec 08  –1.88  0.00 
1  Argentina, Central Bank of Argentina (BCRA) seven-day reverse repo rate; for Brazil, SELIC target rate; for Chile, official monetary policy 
rate; for China, benchmark one-year lending rate; for Colombia, minimum expansion rate; for the Czech Republic, two-week repo rate; for the 
euro area, repo rate; for Hungary, base rate; for India, repo rate; for Indonesia, one-month official discount rate; for Israel, base rate; for Korea, 
target for the overnight call rate; for Japan, overnight call rate; for Malaysia, overnight policy rate; for Mexico, bank funding rate; for Peru, 
reference interest rate; for the Philippines, midpoint of repo and reverse repo rate range; for Poland, reference rate; for Russia, refinancing 
rate; for Saudi Arabia, repo rate; for Singapore, overnight interbank rate; for South Africa, official repo rate; for Turkey, minimum interbank 
overnight rate; for Thailand, overnight repo rate; for the United States, federal funds target rate; in percentage points.    
2  For India, wholesale 
prices; November data for China, Hong Kong SAR, Hungary, Israel, Japan, Malaysia, Singapore, Saudi Arabia and South Africa; December 
data otherwise; annual changes, in per cent.    
3  In basis points. 
Source: national data. 84  BIS Papers No 54
 
 
1.  Interest rates, supplementary tools and policy assignment 
As noted above, central banks used a variety of tools to respond to the crisis, including 
changes in monetary operations and reduced reserve requirements as well as changes in 
policy rates. Indeed, the crisis has generated considerable interest in the use of 
supplementary or “macroprudential” instruments to dampen boom and bust cycles.
20 This 
raises the question of how these instruments might be related to interest rate policy. Both 
interest rates and supplementary instruments are ways of trying to ease or tighten financial 
conditions and ultimately affect the availability and cost of financing for private and public 
borrowers. For example, it has been demonstrated that interest rates and capital adequacy 
ratios may both be adjusted to deal with the same macroeconomic or financial shock.
21 They 
are partial substitutes (ie the authorities can raise interest rates or capital requirements). As 
macroprudential instruments do this by  influencing the incentives and robustness of the 
financial sector they have a direct effect on the monetary policy transmission mechanism. 
From this point of view, such instruments can strengthen or weaken how the policy rate is 
ultimately reflected in the availability and cost of financing faced by borrowers (private and 
public).  
How much interest rates and macroprudential instruments will be used will depend in part on 
the monetary framework, whether macroeconomic and financial stability considerations 
coincide, the effects of these instruments and institutional considerations.  
For example, under a fixed exchange rate regime (eg Hong Kong SAR), policymakers have 
no interest rate tool and would have to rely on supplementary tools. In some cases, such as 
when there are rising inflationary pressures, rapid credit growth and higher asset prices, both 
policy interest rates and supplementary macroprudential instruments should clearly reinforce 
each other to tighten financing conditions. A more difficult question is how to deal with 
possible policy dilemmas. For example, as noted above, following the collapse of Lehman 
Brothers some EME authorities were faced with, on the one hand, high inflation, and, on the 
other hand, tightening financing conditions and the risk of a severe economic downturn.
22 
Some central banks (eg Brazil and Peru) lowered reserve requirements to enhance domestic 
currency financing, while keeping interest rates unchanged (Graph 2); they only lowered 
rates as inflation prospects improved. In other EMEs, however, there was greater 
synchronisation of interest rates and reserve requirements. There are also important 
differences in the use of reserve requirements over the cycle; for example, China and India 
appear to have relied more heavily on adjustments to reserve requirements during the period 
of expansion prior to the failure of Lehman Brothers than other EMEs.  
The development or condition of the financial system may also have a bearing on the types 
of instruments used. For example, in some cases where domestic interbank markets are less 
developed, the authorities may find it more effective to set bank lending rates (eg as in 
                                                  
20   Some of these instruments are monetary or microprudential, now re-examined through a macroprudential lens 
with a view to assessing their implications for the business cycle, credit growth and systemic risks or financial 
stability. Apart from reserve requirements, the instruments include measures that influence credit and the 
quality of bank balance sheets, such as credit targets or ceilings on credit (eg ceilings are used by Korea 
focusing on credit to small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs)), loan-to-value (LTV) ratios (eg used in 
Hong Kong SAR), capital adequacy requirements and buffers, and loan loss provisioning (notably 
countercyclical dynamic provisioning, recently adopted in Colombia). For a discussion of macroprudential 
instruments see CGFS (2010). 
21   See Cecchetti (2009). 
22  During expansion periods in the 2000s, a common dilemma was posed by a combination of low goods and 
services price inflation with rapid increases in both credit growth and asset prices. The questions then are: to 
what extent should interest rates respond to asset price increases or rapid credit growth? What role should be 
assigned to supplementary or macroprudential instruments? BIS Papers No 54  85
 
 
China) directly rather than to rely exclusively on open market operations to set interbank 
rates. The way in which supplementary tools affect the transmission of monetary policy will 
determine the extent to which they will be used. In some cases, higher reserve requirements 
do not increase deposit rates and could be used to tighten financing conditions without 
attracting capital inflows during periods of expansion.
23 This could address the dilemma 
faced by the authorities regarding the need to raise domestic interest rates during periods of 
large and expansionary capital inflows. 
Institutional factors are an important determinant of which tools are used. Many central banks 
are no longer responsible for financial supervision and regulation; consequently, reserve 
requirements are one of the few supplementary tools they have available to influence 
financing conditions in the economy.
24 Coordination between central banks and supervisory 
authorities is necessary to ensure that other tools (eg capital adequacy requirements, loan 
loss provisioning, etc) are used in conjunction with monetary policy to dampen boom and 
bust cycles and preserve medium-term financial stability.  
III. Assessment  of  crisis responses  
A.  Measures to provide foreign currency liquidity or financing  
BIS staff contributions to this volume
25 indicate that global factors played a large role in 
determining the incidence of stress episodes reported by central banks during the recent 
crisis. In this setting, it appears unlikely that the responses by EME authorities could have 
prevented the disruptions in the FX markets or interruptions in external financing; for them to 
do so, global financial conditions had to stabilise. Instead, measures to improve the 
availability of foreign currency liquidity (drawing on foreign reserves, and in some cases on 
foreign exchange swap facilities) appear to have compensated for or covered shortfalls in 
foreign currency financing until global market conditions improved, which occurred sometime 
around the second quarter of 2009. For example, in Korea, operations to support foreign 
currency financing (for which US$ 55 billion in foreign reserves were set aside) appear to 
have played a major role in ensuring that the decline in the rollover ratio on maturing foreign 
debt to around 40% in the latter part of 2008 did not result in widespread defaults and lasting 
interruptions in external financing. Measures to provide foreign currency financing, in Korea 
and elsewhere, may also have helped to dampen exchange rate volatility, and lowered 
financing costs for borrowers seeking to access new credit or roll over external debts. One 
indication of the success of these measures is that, as conditions have normalised, private 
capital flows have returned and some of the foreign currency financing support in EMEs has 
been successfully withdrawn.  
There is some empirical evidence on the effectiveness of these measures.
26 In the 
Hong Kong Monetary Authority (HKMA) contribution to this meeting, Fung and Yu (2010) find 
                                                  
23   For further analysis of how reserve requirements affect monetary policy transmission, see the contribution in 
this volume by Vargas, Betancourt, Varela and Rodríguez (2010).  
24   In countries where the central bank is also responsible for bank supervision and regulation, other tools 
become available. For example, the RBI adjusted the risk weights for capital adequacy requirements or loan 
loss provisioning requirements to contain risks associated with credit to certain sectors. In the aftermath of the 
collapse of Lehman Brothers, it lowered the statutory liquidity ratio of the banking sector but has since 
restored it to its previous level (see Sinha. (2010)). 
25   See Takats (2010) and Moreno and Villar (2010, particularly Graph 1). 
26   See also discussion in section I.B.2 of this paper. 86  BIS Papers No 54
 
 
that HKMA policy actions helped mitigate dislocations in the money and FX swap markets 
and effectively reduced the covered interest parity (CIP) deviations following the collapse of 
Lehman Brothers. Furthermore, a recent study of Brazil (Stone et al (2009)) finds that the 
measures by the Central Bank of Brazil reduced on impact the relative cost of onshore dollar 
financing (a market proxy for FX liquidity). However, announcement effects are estimated to 
be bigger than those of the interventions themselves. In particular, the announcement of the 
FX swap with the Federal Reserve had the biggest empirical effect suggesting that external, 
rather than domestic, policy responses to the crisis played the largest role in stabilising 
market conditions. The level and implied volatility of the spot exchange rate are also 
estimated to have been positively affected by the FX easing measures, implying that those 
measures stabilised the exchange rate in addition to easing dollar liquidity.  
B.  Measures to provide financing in domestic markets and monetary policy 
responses 
The preceding discussion suggests that one of the key goals of policymakers in adopting the 
auxiliary measures discussed below was to preserve the flow of credit and consequently the 
operation of the monetary transmission mechanism. While more systematic analysis is 
needed to assess the various measures adopted, an impression can be obtained by 
reviewing: (i) the path of interest rates at various maturities as policy rates were lowered; 
(ii) the behaviour of credit to the private sector over time. 
1.  Interest rate behaviour 
Financing conditions in domestic money markets and in the banking sector improved from 
around December 2008 onwards as policy rate declines were associated with significant 
reductions in interbank and average bank lending rates (Table 3). In contrast, the reductions 
in bond yields were generally smaller (in some cases yields increased), so that yield curves 
in EMEs steepened.  
The decline in three-month and bank lending rates suggests that programmes to support the 
banking sector and credit extension, as well as the reduction in policy rates, may have 
helped to lower the cost of credit. Competitive pressures among banks to obtain business as 
economic activity weakened may also have played a role. These effects appear to have 
offset the factors that contributed to the downward rigidity in domestic bond yields, including 
widening risk premia for assets at longer maturities. 




Interest rates changes  
1 December 2008–31 December 2009 















Emerging Asia          
China  –0.3 –0.9  –0.3  0.5  –1.2 
Hong Kong SAR  –0.5 –1.9  –0.1  0.4  ... 
India  –2.8 –5.9  –1.5  0.2  ... 
Indonesia  –3.0 –4.9  –1.1 –6.3  –6.0 
Korea  –2.0 –2.6  –1.7 –0.1  ... 
Malaysia  –1.3 –1.3  –1.1  0.4  –1.7 
Philippines  –2.0 0.1  –1.8  –1.3  –2.4 
Singapore  –0.2 –0.1  0.0 –0.3  ... 
Thailand  –2.5 –2.5  –1.4  0.2  ... 
Latin America         
Argentina  –1.5 –7.4  –21.1  1.9  –9.3 
Brazil  –5.0 –5.1  –15.0 –3.4  –2.0 
Chile  –7.8 –7.9  ... –1.0  –1.5 
Colombia  –6.5 –6.2  –7.6 –4.2  –2.7 
Mexico  –3.8 –3.6  –5.5 –1.7  –1.9 
Peru  –5.3 –5.4  –0.8 –3.5  –2.6 
Other emerging 
markets 
       
Czech Republic  –1.8 –2.5  –0.4 –0.0  ... 
Hungary  –4.8 –4.9  –3.2 –0.8  –2.1 
Israel  –1.3 –1.4  –2.0 –0.6  ... 
Poland  –2.3 –2.5  –2.0  1.0  –0.7 
Russia  –3.3 –9.6  –0.3 –0.6  –5.2 
Saudi Arabia  –1.0 –4.2  ...  ...  ... 
South Africa  –5.0 –4.8  –5.0  0.1  –3.7 
Turkey  –9.8 –12.9  ... –10.4 –3.2 
1 Argentina, BCRA seven-day reverse repo rate; for Brazil, SELIC target rate; for Chile, official monetary policy rate; for China, benchmark one-
year lending rate; for Colombia, minimum expansion rate; for the Czech Republic, two-week repo rate; for Hungary, base rate; for India, repo 
rate; for Indonesia, one-month official discount rate; for Israel, base rate; for Korea, target for the overnight call rate; for Malaysia, overnight 
policy rate; for Mexico, bank funding rate; for Peru, reference interest rate; for the Philippines, midpoint of repo and reverse-repo rate range; for 
Poland, reference rate; for Russia, refinancing rate; for Saudi Arabia, repo rate; for Singapore, overnight interbank rate; for South Africa, official 
repo rate; for Turkey, minimum interbank overnight rate; for Thailand, overnight repo rate; in percentage points.   
2 For India, wholesale prices; 
December data for Chile, Colombia, the Czech Republic, Indonesia, Korea, Mexico, Peru, the Philippines, Russia, Thailand and Turkey; 
November data otherwise.    
2  Argentina, BCRA issues at issue, closest to one-year maturity (one-year maturity until February 2007); for 
Israel, eight-year government bond; for the Philippines, 10-year government bond; for Turkey, two-year government bond; five-year 
government bond yield otherwise.    
3  EMBI Global. 
Sources: IMF, International Financial Statistics; Bloomberg; CEIC; Datastream; JPMorgan Chase; national data. 
 
A more precise assessment of these effects requires systematic empirical analysis. In 
Hong Kong, empirical analysis by Fung and Yu (2010) indicates that policy actions did not 
affect the three-month HIBOR–OIS spread (the indicator of stress in the interbank market), in 
line with IMF findings on the apparent ineffectiveness of liquidity support measures by central 
banks in developed countries. One explanation is that the actions may have been anticipated 
by market participants. However, as noted above, the HKMA’s actions appear to have 
mitigated disruptions in the FX swap markets. The HKMA assigns particular importance to 
the role of its five temporary measures (see Fung and Yu (2010)) in stimulating interbank 
financing, by reducing uncertainty about the availability of funds (by providing additional 
longer-term funding to banks against a wider range of collateral at a potentially lower interest 
cost) and reducing perceived counterparty risk (by containing the solvency risk in the banking 
system).  88  BIS Papers No 54
 
 
2.  Trends in bank credit 
Bank credit displayed a robust upward trend in most EMEs until around the third quarter of 
2008. The trend later flattened in a number of countries and declined in others (the last with a 
recent rebound – see Graph 3).  
An important question is the extent to which the decline in credit growth reflected reductions 
in credit supply or demand. A reduction in credit supply would suggest that the impact of the 
crisis on the financial sector has amplified the effects of the very large cyclical downturn. In 
contrast, if demand effects are dominant, this would suggest that efforts to supply financing 
and support the operation of the financial sector have been successful in boosting credit 
supply and mitigating the adverse effects of the crisis in developed financial markets. While 
disentangling credit supply and demand effects requires more systematic analysis, the fact 
that the decline in credit growth in 2009 was accompanied by much easier financing 
conditions than in October–November 2008 and lower policy and bank lending rates (Table 3 
and Annex Graph A1) suggests that reduced credit demand has been an important driver of 
slower credit growth.
27 At least two factors – bank deposits and still strong balance sheets – 
appear to have supported credit supply. The policy responses cited above may also have 
helped. 
Reliance on bank deposits, which on average tended to grow. Loan-to-deposit ratios in many 
EMEs tend to be below unity, suggesting a greater reliance on deposits (as opposed to 
wholesale financing) to fund credit. On average, deposits in EMEs have remained on an 
upward trend, which would tend to support credit growth. However, this in part reflects 
substitution away from other investments in favour of the banking sector. It may also reflect 
the impact of guarantees or other policies to support the banking sector. These averages 
mask significant cross-country variation as loan-to-deposit ratios exceed unity in some 
countries (eg Chile and Colombia). Furthermore, deposits have recently declined or 
displayed volatility in a number of EMEs (Graph A2).  
Still strong balance sheets.
28 The relative resilience of bank deposits was at least partly the 
result of the strength of banks’ balance sheets. This was reflected in: (i) the  limited 
deterioration in credit quality; (ii) still profitable banks; and (iii) significant capital buffers and 
bank resilience to shocks. The cyclical downturn tended to reduce borrower creditworthiness, 
with lending to exporters, SMEs and households in some cases posing concerns. However, 
median NPL ratios in a set of EMEs have been low, declining from around 7% at the 
beginning of the decade to less than 3% in 2007. Furthermore, unlike many banks in 
advanced economies, EME banks generally had limited exposure to toxic assets.
29 
Present indications for most countries are that NPL ratios will generally not reach the levels 
observed in past crises. With regard to bank profitability, while profits fell from their peaks in 
2007, banks remained profitable in a number of EMEs. Both narrowing net interest margins 
and in some cases increases in provisioning (to cover loan losses) lowered profitability. More 
generally, however, bank provisions to NPLs tended to decline (countercyclically) as the 
economy slowed. Lastly, by 2007, banks in EMEs typically had regulatory capital ratios well 
above the minimum 8% (based on the 1988 Basel Accord). In some countries, Tier 1 capital 
ratios also exceeded 8%.  
                                                  
27   Credit supply factors also appear to have been important; see Cowan and Marfán (2010). 
28  Some central bank contributions for this meeting (eg Ibrahim (2010), Sidaoui, Cuadra and Ramos Francia 
(2010) and Kozinski (2010)) highlight the importance of robust banking systems.  




Domestic bank credit to the private sector
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1    In nominal and local currency terms.       
2    Weighted average of the economies listed, based on 2005 GDP and PPP exchange
rates.    
3  Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru and Venezuela.    
4  Chinese Taipei, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Korea, 
Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand.    
5  The Czech Republic, Hungary, Israel, Poland, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa 
and Turkey. 
Source: national data. 
3. Other  criteria 
Dampening shocks. A concern during a crisis is ensuring that any major exchange rate or 
asset price shock is not amplified. Trying to dampen exchange rate or asset price volatility 
poses some trade-offs. On the one hand, not allowing adjustment can be distortionary – 
movements in financial prices can help with the price discovery process if they absorb 
shocks or stimulate corrective action. On the other hand, a lot of volatility could lead to 
market closure and aggravate financial stability risks. This is the case if there is a breakdown 
in the payment system; a loss of confidence in the liquidity position of banks that can lead to 
a bank run; or if firms are unable to adjust their exposures. Output volatility also poses 
concerns if firms or households are unable to borrow.  90  BIS Papers No 54
 
 
Innocent bystanders. It is generally accepted that those taking excessive risks should pay the 
consequences of their actions. Unfortunately, during a crisis, many other parties   
– households, companies, or even governments – are negatively affected, even if they did 
not take excessive risks. In other words, their behaviour did not cause the crisis; they were 
“innocent bystanders”. For central banks, sustaining economic activity and avoiding high 
unemployment become strong macroeconomic arguments for ensuring continued access to 
credit for such “innocent bystanders”.  
Exit policies. An important issue in the assessment of crisis responses is the relative ease in 
exiting from these policies. For example, efforts to unwind unconventional policies (eg to end 
central bank operations at longer maturities) could complicate interest rate policy, raising 
communication problems. If a central bank were to discontinue operations at longer 
maturities it could be interpreted as monetary policy tightening even if the central bank has 
no intention of raising the policy rate. Exiting from other policies that have a bearing on 
financial stability could also pose concerns. For example, the authorities in a number of 
EMEs have provided guarantees on external debt or bank deposits. These guarantees pose 
moral hazard issues, so there is an incentive to remove them as soon as possible. The 
timing of the exit from these policies has generally been announced either as a fixed date or 
as conditional on the normalisation of financial conditions. However, in financially integrated 
economies, exiting could make financial systems vulnerable to increases in market volatility. 
Withdrawing guarantees when others have not done so can also present difficulties, so there 
are issues of cross-country coordination. Policies to support certain sectors (eg SMEs) raise 
the issue of balancing the need for support to “innocent victims” of the crisis against the need 
to ensure that sectors can function independently as the recovery proceeds. 
On balance, the authorities appear to have accepted a significant amount of volatility in 
exchange rates and in equity and bond prices. At the same time, the steps taken appear to 
have helped countries to emerge with their financial systems relatively intact (ie no 
breakdown in payments, no runs, and the ability – sometimes with government assistance – 
to close positions). The flow of credit to some more vulnerable borrowers and “innocent 
bystanders” (eg SMEs
30) was facilitated in some cases by government policies or the actions 
of state-owned banks. As for exit policies, these have been facilitated in EMEs by fairly 
robust economic recovery and attractiveness as investment destinations. 
IV. Conclusions   
What did central banks learn about the instruments at their disposal for dealing with the 
domestic repercussions of an international financial crisis? A number of points may be 
highlighted from this brief survey.  
First, central banks successfully found ways to provide financing in FX markets to offset the 
sudden withdrawal of foreign funding and disruptions in international FX markets. In many 
cases, intervention had to be designed to address complex issues, such as the smooth 
unwinding of foreign currency derivatives positions in some countries. Some central banks 
found ways of increasing confidence, thereby reducing uncertainty about counterparty risks 
or the availability of financing. These factors played a large role in preventing defaults on 
external debts as well as lasting disruptions to EME financial systems.  
Second, a number of central banks drew heavily on foreign reserves, reinforcing perceptions 
that adequate levels of such reserves are needed. However, the crisis raises new questions 
                                                  
30   Ibrahim (2010) discusses the condition of SMEs in Malaysia.  BIS Papers No 54  91
 
 
about the appropriate measures of foreign reserve adequacy. At the same time, there have 
been very large increases in the availability of foreign currency resources for EMEs, and the 
extent to which such resources could provide an alternative to domestic foreign reserve 
accumulation warrants further examination. 
Third, central banks innovated in a number of ways to support local currency financing. A 
number of central banks extended maturities, accepted new types of collateral and also new 
counterparties in implementing open market operations. Others reduced reserve 
requirements, in some cases in ways that provided support to priority sectors. These 
measures appear to have contributed to easier domestic financing conditions and supported 
domestic credit. In this context, the strength of domestic banking systems appears to have 
played an important role (eg by helping to stabilise deposits). However, exiting from some of 
these measures raises a number of challenges in terms of implications for monetary policy, 
financial stability or necessary structural adjustment. 
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1  10-day moving average.    
2  Interbank overnight.   
3  Interbank 3-month.    
4 5-year government bond yield.    
5  EMBI Global.    
6  IMF 
International Financial  Statistics definitions.   
 7  The interbank overnight rate peaked at 43.725% on 21 March 2007. 
Sources: IMF, International Financial Statistics; Bloomberg; CEIC; Datastream; JPMorgan Chase; national data. 
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Graph A1 (cont) 
Interest rate  
In per cent  

































































2007 2008 2009  
    
1  10-day moving average.    
2  Interbank overnight.    
3  Interbank three-month.    
4  Argentina, BCRA issues at 
issue, closest to one-year maturity (one-year maturity until February 2007; five-year government bond yield 
otherwise.    
5  IMF International Financial Statistics definitions. 
Sources: IMF, International Financial Statistics; Bloomberg; CEIC; Datastream; JPMorgan Chase; national data. 
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Graph A1 (cont) 
Interest rate 
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1  10-day moving average.    
2  Interbank overnight.    
3  Interbank three-month.    
4  Argentina, BCRA issues at 
issue, closest to one-year maturity (one-year maturity until February 2007); for the Philippines, 10-year 
government bond yield; five-year government bond yield otherwise.    
5  IMF International Financial Statistics
definitions.  
Sources: IMF, International Financial Statistics; Bloomberg; CEIC; Datastream; JPMorgan Chase; national data. 
 






















































































1    In nominal and local currency terms.       
2    Weighted average of the economies listed, based on 2005 GDP and PPP exchange
rates.    
3  Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru and Venezuela.    
4  China, Chinese Taipei, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, 
Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand.       
5    The Czech Republic, Hungary, Israel, Poland, Russia, Saudi Arabia 
South Africa and Turkey. 
Source: national data. 
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